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Abstract The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has a monopoly on the
provision of climate policy advice at the international level and a strong market position in
national policy advice. This may have been the intention of the founders of the IPCC. I
argue that the IPCC has a natural monopoly, as a new entrant would have to invest time and
effort over a longer period to perhaps match the reputation, trust, goodwill, and network of
the IPCC. The IPCC is a not-for-profit organization, and it is run by nominal volunteers. It
therefore cannot engage in the price-gouging that is typical of monopolies. However, the
IPCC has certainly taken up tasks outside its mandate. The IPCC has been accused of
haughtiness. Innovation is slow. Quality may have declined. And the IPCC may have used
its power to hinder competitors. There are all things that monopolies tend to do, against the
public interest. The IPCC would perform better if it were regulated by an independent body
which audits the IPCC procedures and assesses its performance; if outside organizations
would be allowed to bid for the production of reports and the provision of services under
the IPCC brand; and if policy makers would encourage potential competitors to the IPCC.
1 Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a runaway success. From
humble beginnings in the late 1980s, it is now seen by many national and subnational
governments as the ultimate authority on scientific matters on climate change (Agrawala
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1998a; Agrawala 1998b; Hulme and Mahony 2010; Nishioka 2008; Oppenheimer et al.
2007; Rothman et al. 2009). The IPCC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 2008. However,
there has been criticism of the IPCC from November 2009 onwards (Economist 2011;
Hulme 2010; Kintisch 2010; McKitrick 2010; Nature 2010; New Scientist 2010; Rosenthal
2010; Schiermeier 2010; The Economist 2010c; Wynne 2010), the sharpness of which
dwarfs earlier critique. This is to a large extent because of political opposition to climate policy,1
but I argue below that there are design flaws in the IPCC as well. I also offer remedies.
Climate change succeeded acidification. Many academics and policy makers who used to
work on acid rain moved to climate change when acidification was “solved”. Some argue that
the negotiations on acidifying substances did not succeed until after all parties had accepted a
common, scientific understanding of the problem. International acidification policy is indeed
informed by a single body of technocratic advice2—a knowledge monopoly (Castells and
Funtowicz 1997; Gough et al. 1998; Hordijk 1991; Hordijk 1995; Hordijk and Kroeze 1997).
The formation of the IPCC was at least partly inspired by this example.
Note that there is no reason to assume that knowledge monopolies are desirable. The
nature of the policy advice on acidification was in turn inspired by the ideal of social
planning as advocated by such leading economists as (Tinbergen 1952; Tinbergen 1954)—
whose ideas are now seen as naïve by some (Nove 1983) and repugnant by others
(Friedman and Friedman 1980). Harry Truman’s wish for a one-handed economist is now
understood to be mistaken (Economist 2003). The notion of a dispassionate scientist
passing objective advice to a benevolent policy maker has been thoroughly discredited
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994; Pielke 2007).
Few would argue that the IPCC is a secret world government in waiting. The IPCC has
set itself the more modest goal of standardizing the academic knowledge on which climate
policy is based across the world.3 This may be a mistaken goal. International negotiations
succeed if all parties think they are better off (Barrett 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco 1998).
There is no reason to believe that negotiations are easier if all parties share the same
knowledge—in fact, the opposite may be true (Kamada and Kominers 2010; Ulph and
Maddison 1997).
However, this paper is not about whether the IPCC was a mistake. The IPCC exists and
it will not cease to do so in the foreseeable future. This paper is about how to regulate the
IPCC. There are a number of earlier papers on this, mostly from people who are against
climate policy (Alexander 2007; Dawson 2008; Dawson 2009; Henderson 2007; Henderson
2009; Peiser 2007; Zillman 2007) with a few exceptions (Solomon and Manning 2008;
Terradas and Penuelas 2008). There is a substantial discussion on the much narrower topic
of communication of uncertainty in IPCC reports (Budescu et al. 2009; Moss and Schneider
2000; Risbey and Kandlikar 2007b). In Section 2, I argue that the IPCC has a natural
monopoly—regardless of the intentions of its founders, there can be only one IPCC-like
organization. In Section 3, I discuss some of the problems typically found in monopolistic
markets, in this case the market for climate policy advice, and illustrate this with examples
from the IPCC, including its treatment of uncertainty. In Section 4, I present solutions.
Section 5 concludes.
1 Because greenhouse gas emission reduction is often (yet incorrectly) couched in terms of scientific
necessity, opponents are led to attack the science and the scientific institutions. The debate was particularly
vehement in the United Kingdom as the three main parties all called for stringent emission reduction, and the
opposition was therefore unconstrained by (the prospect of) the responsibilities of government.
2 The RAINS model, hosted at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Alcamo et al. 1990).
3 http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm
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2 The IPCC as a natural monopoly
Natural monopolies occur when there are substantial economies of scale or scope, or when
the costs of fixed capital are large (Baumol et al. 1982; Sharkey 1982). Railroads and
electricity distribution networks are examples of the latter. The costs of laying tracks and
cables are so high that it does not pay off to have two or three competing networks. One
network is the maximum the consumer is willing to pay for, and a monopoly is the result.
Economies of scale or scope are another reason for natural monopolies to form. Waste
collection is an example. It is far cheaper to collect all rubbish in a street with a single truck
than to let one truck serve some houses and another truck the remaining ones. Waste is
therefore best collected by a (local, temporal) monopoly.
Strictly speaking, a monopoly is natural if the costs of having multiple providers are
larger than the benefits of competition. As there are little data available, I cannot prove that
the IPCC has a natural monopoly. Nonetheless, the IPCC shares some of the characteristics
of a natural monopoly. There is large fixed cost of setting up a global organization to assess
the literature on climate change to inform national and international policy. This cost is
neither physical (e.g., water pipes) nor financial (e.g., equity), but rather in terms of
reputation, trust and goodwill, and in terms of networks and institutional knowledge. It took
the IPCC years to build up its current position. A new entrant in the market of climate
policy advice would need a similar investment in quality and relationships before it can
begin to compete with the IPCC.
The IPCC is also favoured by network economies. The IPCC relies on more-or-less
voluntary contributions of the academics who serve as its authors. These authors are
rewarded with prestige, networking opportunities, access to decision makers, and
influence.4 As the incumbent, the IPCC offers plenty of each. A new entrant would offer
little. The IPCC is thus a natural monopsony on the input market for expertise.5 As the
IPCC ultimately derives its status as a policy advisor from the reputation of its contributors,
this natural monopsony implies a natural monopoly.
So, the costs of establishing a competitor to the IPCC are high. The benefits would be
small, as the would-be competitor would review the same literature and presumably reach
roughly the same conclusions. Therefore, the IPCC has something that is akin to a natural
monopoly.
3 Typical problems of monopolies
In the standard model, monopolies restrict supply to drive up the price and extract
supernormal profits. Monopoly rents are readily detectable, and thus targeted by regulators.
Regulated monopolies therefore often have excessive costs (e.g., large number of staff, high
wages) or cross-subsidize another part of the same company—financed through the abuse
of monopoly power. Monopolies may also reduce the quality of their product or service,
while offering it at the same price. Monopolies also tend to innovate less—as there is no
competition to stay ahead of. Such practices are harder to detect (Baumol et al. 1982;
Sharkey 1982).
4 IPCC authorship also offers opportunities to travel and earn per diems, which is particularly valuable to
scholars from developing countries.
5 Alternatively, one could see the IPCC as a club, and authorship as a club good. As the IPCC is the only
significant club, this does not affect the reasoning below.
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The root of the problem is that monopolies act in the interest of the company only, and
that they can get away with it. Competitive firms too only consider their own bottom line—
but they have to deliver good value to their clients lest they walk away.6 Customers of
monopolies cannot switch to a different supplier (by definition), and monopolies therefore
do not need to heed their wishes to the same extent as a competitive firm does.
The IPCC is a knowledge monopoly, and it shares some of the characteristics of the
behaviour of a typical monopolist. Obviously, the IPCC does not charge for its services, and
therefore is not engaged in price gouging. The IPCC does not employ many people either,
nor can it splash out on fancy offices. Authors and officials have used the IPCC to advance
their own careers, but that would have happened in any case.
However, the IPCC does use its brand to branch out into areas outside its core mandate.
While the IPCC was set-up to assess the research on climate change, it has also engaged in
primary research on scenario building (Nakicenovic and Swart 2001), standard setting
(Schimel et al. 1996), monitoring,7 and research funding.8 The IPCC is not particularly
well-suited for these activities, and one may argue that it would have failed in these tasks
had it not been for a cross-subsidy in kind (goodwill, reputation, trust).
The IPCC has moved into the territory of academia (e.g., MIT), UN agencies (e.g.,
UNEP) and Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., World Bank) with regard to scenario building,
of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technical Advice and the Secretariat of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change with regard to standards and monitoring, and of
public, private, and multilateral research financers and capacity builders with regard to
research funding.
The IPCC has used its monopoly power to branch out into scenario building. The
resulting scenarios have been severely criticized (Castles and Henderson 2003a; Castles and
Henderson 2003b; Girod et al. 2009; Gruebler et al. 2004; O’Neill et al. 2008; O’Neill and
Nakicenovic 2008; Pielke et al. 2008), but AR4 glossed over the problems (Fisher et al.
2007). As complaints by referees were ignored, this can only be characterized as a
deliberate misrepresentation of the literature—a violation of the IPCC mandate. Arguably,
the IPCC used its role as an assessor of the literature to protect its role as a builder of
scenarios.
The IPCC scenarios are more widely used than any of the alternatives. This is true for
the climatological literature, the impact literature, and the emission reduction literature. This
is partly because standardization of scenarios enables comparison of results and partly
because the IPCC reports are more likely to refer to papers that use IPCC scenarios. A
rational researcher would therefore use the dominant scenarios—that is, those of the IPCC.
The scenarios run with the large-scale climate models are coordinated with the IPCC.
Therefore, the IPCC has used its monopoly position in the market for assessment to
establish a dominant position in the market for scenarios.
Some would say that the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart 2001) and the
associated controversy are old hat. Indeed, the IPCC is introducing new scenarios (Moss et
al. 2010). Unfortunately, although there will be new scenarios and new acronyms, the same
models will be used, repeating the same mistakes as were made before.
6 Competitive firms and monopolies are thus aretaically and deontologically equivalent: Their motivation is
the same and they respond in the same way to the same impulses. Their behaviour is different because their
environment is different.
7 http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/
8 http://www.ipcc.ch/ipcc-scholarship-programme/ipcc_scholarshipprogramme.html
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One may also argue that the quality of the IPCC reports has declined over time, another
characteristic of a monopoly. This is hard to measure. AR4 certainly received far more negative
attention than AR3—but that may also be because expectations have risen or the political
climate has hardened. And parts of AR2 were strongly criticized too, on the “discernible human
influence on global climate” (Edwards and Schneider 2001; Lindzen 1997) and on the
monetary value of mortality risks (Bruce 1996; Courtney 1996; Grubb 1996; Pearce 1995a;
Pearce 1995b; Pearce 1995c). The response of the IPCC to (alleged) errors in its emissions
scenarios and the AR4, and to (alleged) conflicts of interest can be described as haughty (The
Economist 2003a; The Economist 2003b; The Economist 2010a; The Economist 2010b),
which may be inspired by the knowledge that the IPCC has captive clients.
The treatment of uncertainty is another sign of monopolistic behavior. The IPCC has
spent an extraordinary amount of effort and time on guidance on how to treat uncertainty in
its reports (Moss and Schneider 2000; Shapiro et al. 2010)9, 10—culminating in a rather thin
and superficial guidance note.11 There is an academic literature on this topic too (Budescu
et al. 2009; Risbey and Kandlikar 2007a; van der Sluijs et al. 2010). Is this in the interest of
the clients of the IPCC? The main purpose of the uncertainty guidance is to establish
internal consistency. This is an obvious boon to the IPCC Bureau and Technical Support
Units who need to read through the entire report, but less important to average reader who
may carefully read one chapter and browse through a few others. The emphasis on internal
consistency thus serves the organization rather than its clients. Clients of the IPCC are
better served with external consistency and an honest appraisal of the uncertainties—and
the IPCC falls short on that.
For instance, the AR3 concluded, with medium confidence, that the economic impacts of
initial climate change would be beneficial (Smith et al. 2001). This was based on a single,
published study. AR4 reached the same conclusion (Schneider et al. 2007), but with low
confidence—even though a number of papers had been published that confirmed the beneficial
economic impacts of modest climate change, and no studies that reached the opposite
conclusion (Tol 2009). Both AR3 and AR4 followed the letter of the uncertainty guidance.
Finally, the IPCC has not innovated much. An author of AR1 would instantly recognize
the methods, procedures, and structure of AR4. Things have changed, of course, but at the
margin. This is perhaps the strongest sign that the IPCC is a monopoly. Since AR1, our
understanding of the climate problem has changed dramatically. New technologies have
emerged that drastically change the way people interact (e.g., blogs) and knowledge is
disseminated and created (e.g., wikis)—while the internet brought access to unprecedented
amounts of information. Yet, the IPCC still works with small teams of authors who fly to
faraway cities to draft a chapter. Once finished, the chapter is fixed (Nature 2010). IPCC
reports are the received wisdom flowing unidirectionally from the experts to the lay people
(Beck 2010). The IPCC has largely avoided meta-analytical techniques, although the
literature has grown fast since AR1 (Kuik et al. 2009; Parmesan and Yohe 2003; Root et al.
2003; Tavoni and Tol 2010; van den Bergh et al. 1997). For some IPCC chapters in AR4,
none of the authors seemed to have had access to specialized academic databases and
search tools.12 The IPCC has made little use of tools for online collaboration and
9 http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/meetings/CGCs/index.html
10 http://www.ipcc.ch/meetings/session32/doc15_p32_report__cross_wg_mtg_cons_eval_uncert%20.pdf
11 https://www.ipcc-wg1.unibe.ch/publications/supportingmaterial/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf
12 For example, (Barker et al. 2007) find only one peer-reviewed paper on the impact of climate policy on
employment while (Patuelli et al. 2005) find 94 papers.
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communication, nor of transparency-enhancing software (e.g., automated versioning of
documents).
4 Regulating knowledge monopolies
It is often best to break up monopolies. However, this is not the case for natural
monopolies. Natural monopolies should be regulated (Beck 2010; Berg and Tschirhart
1988; Train 1991; Waterson 1988). In Section 2, I argue (but cannot prove) that the IPCC
has a natural monopoly. If so, the IPCC should be regulated rather than broken up.
Appropriate regulation of monopolies begins with the questions which part of the
production and distribution process is a natural monopoly and why. In electricity, the
network is a natural monopoly—but power generation and distribution and even network
maintenance are contestable markets. Transaction costs may (have) justify (justified)
vertical integration (in times past) (Tirole 2000), but are not necessarily offset by the
welfare losses of a monopoly that is more extensive than needed.
There are three types of regulations that have been used to mitigate the negative effects
of monopolies—that is, the regulator makes sure that the monopolist does not abuse its
power. First, the conduct of monopolies is often tightly regulated. Price controls are a
classic example.
Second, if there cannot be competition in the market, there can be competition for the
market. Concessions for waste collection in a particular area or rail services on a certain line
can be sold to the highest bidder. Concessions are temporary monopolies. If the company that
won the concession does not perform well, another company takes over after a few years.
Third, monopolies are in principle threatened by new entrants. This argument is often
made with regard to dominant ICT companies: a smart kid in a garage can revolutionize the
sector. The regulator can therefore keep a monopolist in check by lowering the barriers to
entry and by threatening to switch supplier.13
These types of regulations can be applied to the IPCC as well.
The IPCC has used its monopoly on assessment to establish a firm grip on a related
field, that of long-term scenario building. And the IPCC has done a poor job (see above).
The IPCC should withdraw from scenario development.14
With regard to standard setting, the IPCC has not been particularly forceful in pointing
out the difficulties with global warming potentials (Godal 2003; O’Neill 2000; Shine et al.
2005; Smith 2003). While the IPCC is not responsible for the decision (2/CP.3) of the
Conference of the Parties15 to use the global warming potentials of AR2, the IPCC should
loudly protest against this in AR5—in fact, it should have protested in AR3 and AR4.
The IPCC has spent considerable time and effect on matters that are primarily of concern
to the IPCC itself, such as its guidance on uncertainty. The IPCC should commission a
survey of the needs of its clients, broadly defined, and use the results to prioritize its efforts.
I am not aware of any issues with the IPCC’s involvement in monitoring. The IPCC
scholarship programme is brand new, but there is a risk that IPCC scholars will get
13 This would not be a credible threat in the case of a natural monopoly and a benevolent regulator. It can be
an effective threat if the monopolist is unsure about the true intentions of the regulator and the naturalness of
the monopoly is debatable, as in the case of the IPCC.
14 The Integrated Assessment Modeling Consortium, http://www.iamconsortium.org/, is a front organization
of the IPCC, at least if it comes to scenario development.
15 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf
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preferential treatment in the selection of IPCC authors. It would therefore be better if the
IPCC outsourced this to another organization.
Conduct regulation can help to improve outcomes in natural monopoly markets. At
present, the IPCC is governed as follows.16 IPCC Members meet once a year in a General
Assembly. This is the meeting of the clients and sponsors of the IPCC, and its ultimate
governing body. Day-to-day affairs are delegated to the IPCC Bureau, which combines the
roles of an executive, a policy-maker, and an auditor.17 The Bureau has three key
advantages over the General Assembly: The Bureau has privileged access to information
about the IPCC. Bureau members spend considerably more time and effort on the IPCC
than do General Assembly members. And Bureau members, therefore, have more at stake
than do General Assembly members. The Bureau thus has de facto the upper hand over the
General Assembly, the de jury governing body.
This situation is not unique. National parliaments face the same problem in all aspects of
regulation. Non-executive members of company boards are in the same situation. The
standard solution is the creation of a regulatory agency, whose mandate is to check whether
industry stays within the rules and, occasionally, whether the rules induce the desired
outcome. Auditors fulfill this role in corporations. At present, such auditing of the IPCC is
done through a number of ad hoc activities,18 but this should be regularized.
The regulatory agency should audit the procedural aspects of the IPCC. However, it
should also assess the performance of the IPCC, drawing on the experience with evaluating
the performance of university departments. It could consider such issues as the selection of
the IPCC authors.19 Are they really top experts in their fields (controlling for geographical
representation)? It could randomly select (parts of) IPCC chapters and see whether they
truly reflect the balance of the literature—e.g., by comparison with recent survey articles. It
should compare the outlines of IPCC report to the issues discussed in the literature,
checking whether the IPCC gives undue weight to certain topics while ignoring other ones.
It could monitor the impact of IPCC reports, both on the academic literature and on national
and international policies.
As debates within the IPCC are often highly specialized and hard to follow for outsiders,
the regulatory agency should make a particular effort to facilitate and protect potential
whistleblowers.
The regulatory agency could be a body of the IPCC General Assembly, a joint venture of
the mother organizations of the IPCC (the World Meteorological Organization and the
United Nations Environment Programme), a permanent committee of the InterAcademy
Council, or part of a newly established World Environment Organization. In the last cases,
this regulatory agency could also supervise other international policy assessments. Care
would need to taken that the regulators are sufficiently independent.
At present, the people who control the IPCC are regularly replaced. One could therefore
argue that there is already competition for the market. This is not the case, however.
Competition for the market requires that there is competitive bidding between rival entities—
and that the concession is awarded to the offer with the best price/quality characteristics. The
16 http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.htm
17 The governance of the IPCC would be much improved if the IPCC Chair and Working Group Chairs
would be removed from the IPCC Bureau to form a true executive; and the IPCC Bureau would be reformed
as an independent board under a strong chair.
18 For example, the review by the InterAcademy Council: http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net/
19 Note that the IPCC authors are nominated by governments. In a number of instances, governments have
nominated people to the IPCC for their political colour rather than their expertise. The nomination process
should be audited too, and the IPCC should have the right to appoint non-nominated authors too.
Climatic Change (2011) 108:827–839 833
changing of the IPCC guard is done in backroom deals. In the future, there could be competitive
bidding for the working group chairs and technical support units, as well as for the IPCC board.
National governments have considerable domestic experience with this, and there are
(imperfect) precedents at the international level as well: the Olympic Games and the FIFA
World Cup.
A more radical alternative is the following. Rich IPCC members could pay an annual
contribution, from which the technical support units are paid. Staff would be international,
and less beholden to one particular sponsor government. The OECD, World Bank, and IMF
operate in this manner.
Competition for the market could be extended further. If someone feels that there is a product
missing from the range on offer by the IPCC, then that person should be allowed to bid for the
use of the IPCC brand on such a report. Obviously, the report should meet the IPCC quality
standards and comply with IPCC procedures. Currently, something similar is done through the
IPCC Special Reports, but these originate from within the IPCC. There is no reason why the
IPCC should not consider proposals for Special Reports from outside. In fact, allowing this
would keep the authors and organizers of “regular” IPCC reports on their toes.
The prospect of competition, rather than competition itself, would also keep the IPCC on
its toes. Unfortunately, this is not really an option. The international academies lack the
resources, the mandate, and probably the ambition. Domestically, the national academies
would be the logical choice to write a second opinion—but only the US National
Academies20 may have the resources to organize an assessment at the scale of the IPCC.
Any national assessment would suffer from a lack of legitimacy in other countries—cf. the
cool reception of the Stern Review (Stern et al. 2006) outside Europe.21 Nevertheless,
national assessments should be made widely available, e.g., by translation from Russian
and Chinese to English.
While it would be hard for a single organization to compete with the entirety of the
IPCC, competition on specific aspects is much easier. The World Meteorological
Organization could review atmospheric science (WMO 2006), the World Health
Organization the health impacts of climate change (McMichael et al. 2003; WHO 1990).
The World Bank and the OECD could review the emission reduction policies and their costs
(Bosi et al. 2010; Dellink et al. 2010), while national institutions could assess the impacts of
climate change (Karl, Melillo, and Peterson 2009; BACC Author Team 2008). While such
activities are ongoing, they often draw on the same people as the IPCC and are frequently
not even intended to be independent.
The private sector would have the means, but the parties that would have the keenest
interest to organize and finance an alternative assessment would suffer from a lack of trust
for that very reason.22 Publishers would be the exception. The IPCC reports have been a
commercial success too, and competitors to its house publisher have no doubt been eyeing
the same market. And there has indeed been somewhat of a proliferation of IPCC-like
publications.23 However, no full-blown alternative has been published (or is planned), but
20 http://dels-old.nas.edu/climatechange/
21 This may also be explained by the poor quality of the Stern Review (Arrow 2007; Mendelsohn 2006;
Nordhaus 2007; Weitzman 2007).
22 A poor example is the Non-governmental International Panel on Climate Change http://www.nipccreport.
org/, while the Copenhagen Consensus on Climate is of higher repute (Lomborg 2010)
23 For example, the Wiley Interdisciplinary Review on Climate Change http://wires.wiley.com/WileyCDA/
WiresJournal/wisId-WCC.html,the Encyclopedia of Earth http://www.eoearth.org/ and the Encyclopedia of
Life Support Systems http://www.eolss.net
834 Climatic Change (2011) 108:827–839
this may well happen should the IPCC lose more of its credibility. Climate policy makers
should encourage these developments, but few if any do.
Self-organization is the third, potential new entrant that could threaten the IPCC’s
monopoly. Wikipedia is the best known example, and it already covers all the topics that the
IPCC does. Wikipedia, however, lacks focus and it does not have the credibility and
legitimacy of the IPCC. Many of the climate entries on Wikipedia are of low quality and
balance is sometimes difficult to discern.24 There have been attempts to create quality-
controlled alternatives to Wikipedia aimed at academic audiences,25 but these have not
taken off—which is not to say that they could not. Any new wiki struggles with critical
mass: Why would anyone contribute to something so small? For a climate wiki, this
problem is easily overcome: Wikify AR4 and a few good textbooks. This would create
critical mass. For the sake of competition, this should be supported. By way of experiment,
this should be done by an IPCC-controlled wiki, a quality-controlled wiki (e.g.,
Scholarpedia), and an open wiki (e.g., Wikipedia).
5 Discussion and conclusion
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has a monopoly on the provision of
climate policy advice at the international level and a strong market position in national
policy advice. There is reason to believe that this was the intention of the founders of the
IPCC. One can also make the case that the IPCC has a natural monopoly. A new entrant
would have to make a considerable investment in time and effort over a number of years to
try and match the reputation, trust, goodwill, and network of the IPCC. The IPCC is a not-
for-profit organization run by nominal volunteers and therefore cannot engage in the price-
gouging that is typical of monopolies. However, the IPCC has certainly extended its remit.
Many have accused the IPCC of haughtiness. Internal concerns are prioritized over the
wishes of clients. Innovation is slow. Quality may have declined. And the IPCC may have
used its power to hinder competitors. These are all things that monopolies tend to do, and
none of which is in the public interest. The IPCC would perform better if it were regulated
by an independent body which audits the IPCC procedures and assesses its performance; if
outside organizations would be allowed to bid for the production of IPCC reports and the
provision of IPCC services; and if would-be competitors to the IPCC would be encouraged.
This paper is based on the concept that the IPCC is a supplier in the market for policy
advice. Non-economists may well have a different perspective on the interface between
science and policy and on the role of organizations like the IPCC in that process. It would
be interesting to see whether that would lead to similar conclusions on the need and nature
of IPCC reform.
PBL (2010) reviewed the contents of parts of AR4. It also recommends some procedural
changes to the IPCC, particularly more staff to check drafts and a public log of errors.
(Shapiro et al. 2010) review the procedural aspects of the IPCC. They recommend that an
IPCC executive should be created (see footnote 14), that the position of review editors
should be strengthened, that the IPCC should put more effort into communications, and that
24 This is based on a reading of Wikipedia entries in areas of or adjacent to my expertise. Wikipedia has
better quality with regard to mathematics and economics than for climate change. I have given up editing
Wikipedia on issues relating to climate change.
25 See for example http://www.scholarpedia.org/ and http://www.scitopics.com/
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the organization should become more transparent. While this would indeed improve the
IPCC, these recommendations fall short of those derived here.
Acknowledgements This paper draws on my experiences as an IPCC author since 1994. I am grateful to
Douglas Arent, Brian Fisher, Paul Gorecki, Nigel Lawson, Sean Lyons, Hans von Storch and Gary Yohe for
useful comments and discussion.
References
Agrawala S (1998a) Context and Early Origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Clim
Change 39:605–620
Agrawala S (1998b) Structural and Process History of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Clim
Change 39:621–642
Alcamo J, Shaw R, Hordijk L (eds) (1990) The RAINS Model of Acidification: Science and Strategies in
Europe. Kluwer, Dordrecht
Alexander WJR (2007) The IPCC: Structure, processes and politics climate change—The failure of science.
Energy Environ 18(7–8):1073–1077
Arrow KJ (2007) Global Climate Change: A Challenge to Policy. Economists’ Voice 1–5.
BACC Author Team (2008) Assessment of Climate Change for the Baltic Sea Basin. Springer, Berlin
Barker T, Bashmakov I, Alharthi A, Amann M, Cifuentes L, Drexhage J, Duan M, Edenhofer O, Flannery
BP, Grubb MJ, Hoogwijk M, Ibitoye FI, Jepma CJ, Pizer WA, Yamaji K (2007) Mitigation from a Cross-
Sectoral Perspective. In: Metz B et al (eds) Climate Change 2007: Mitigation—Contribution of Working
Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 619–690
Barrett S (1994) Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 46:878–894
Baumol WJ, Panzar JC, Willig RD (1982) Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York
Beck S (2010) Moving beyond the linear model of expertise? IPCC and the test of adaptation. Regional
Environmental Change. Ref Type: In Press
Berg S, Tschirhart J (1988) Natural Monopoly Regulation: Principles and Practice. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge
Bosi M, Scott D, Spors F (2010) 10 Years of Experience in Carbon Finance: Insights from Working with the
Kyoto Mechanisms, Working Paper 55484 ,World Bank, Washington
Bruce JP (1996) Purpose and Function of IPCC. Nature 379:108–109
Budescu DV, Broomell S, Por HH (2009) Improving communication of uncertainty in the reports of the
intergovernmental panel on climate change. Psychol Sci 20(3):299–308
Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1998) International Environmental Agreements: Incentives and Political Economy.
Eur Econ Rev 42:561–572
Castells N, Funtowicz S (1997) Use of scientific inputs for environmental policy-making: The RAINS model
and the sulfur protocols. Int J Environ Pollut 7(4):512–525
Castles I, Henderson D (2003a) Economics, Emission Scenarios and the Work of the IPCC. Energy &
Environment 14(4):415–435
Castles I, Henderson D (2003b) The IPCC Emission Scenarios: An Economic-Statistical Critique. Energy &
Environment 14(2–3):159–185
Courtney RS (1996) Purpose and Function of IPCC. Nature 379:109
Dawson G (2008) The economic science fiction of climate change: A free-market perspective on the Stern
Review and the IPCC. Econ Affairs 28(4):42–47
Dawson G (2009) Privatising climate policy. Econ Affairs 29(3):57–62
Dellink RB, Briner G, Clapp C (2010) Costs, Revenues and Effectiveness of the Copenhagen Accord
Pledges for 2020, Environment Working Paper (2010)8 ,Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Paris
Economist (2003) The One-Handed Economist. The Economist
Economist (2011) A new row about the IPCC: A climate of conflict. Economist
Edwards PN, Schneider SH (2001) Self-Governance and Peer Review in Science-for-Policy: The Case of the
IPCC Second Assessment Report. In: Miller CA, Edwards PN (eds) Changing the Atmosphere: Expert
Knowledge and Environmental Governance. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 219–246
836 Climatic Change (2011) 108:827–839
Fisher BS, Nakicenovic N, Alfsen KH, Corfee-Morlot J, de la Chesnaye FC, Hourcade J-C, Jiang K,
Kainuma M, la Rovere EL, Matysek A, Rana A, Riahi K, Richels RG, Rose S, van Vuuren DP, Warren
RF (2007) Issues Related to Mitigation in the Long-Term Context. In: Metz B et al (eds) Climate Change
2007: Mitigation—Contribution of Working Group 3 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 169–250
Friedman M, Friedman RD (1980) Free to Choose. Harcourt, San Diego
Funtowicz SO, Ravetz JR (1994) Uncertainty, Complexity and Post-Normal Science. Environ Toxicol Chem
13(12):1881–1885
Girod B, Wiek A, Mieg H, Hulme M (2009) The evolution of the IPCC’s emissions scenarios. Environ Sci
Pol 12(2):103–118
Godal O (2003) The IPCC’s Assessment of Multidisciplinary Issues: The Case of Greenhouse Gas Indices.
Clim Change 58(3):243–249
Gough C, Castells-Cabre N, Funtowicz SO (1998) Integrated Assessment: An Emerging Methodology for
Complex Issues. Environ Model Assess 3:19–29
Grubb MJ (1996) Purpose and Function of IPCC. Nature 379:108
Gruebler A, Nakicenovic N, Alcamo J, Davis G, Fenhann J, Hare B, Mori S, Pepper B, Pitcher HM, Riahi K,
Rogner H-H, Lebre la Rovere E, Sankovski A, Schlesinger ME, Shukla PR, Swart RJ, Victor N, Jung
TY (2004) Emissions Scenarios: A Final Response. Energy & Environment 15(1):11–24
Henderson D (2007) Unwarranted trust: A critique of the IPCC process. Energy Environ 18(7–8):909–928
Henderson D (2009) Climate change issues: A dissenting voice. Econ Affairs 29(3):87–88
Hordijk L (1991) Use of the RAINS Model in Acid Rains Negotiations in Europe. Environ Sci Technol 25
(4):596–603
Hordijk L (1995) Integrated Assessment Models as a Basis for Air Pollution Negotiations. Water Air Soil
Pollut 85:249–260
Hordijk L, Kroeze C (1997) Integrated Assessment Models for Acid Rain. Eur J Oper Res 102:405–417
Hulme M (2010) The IPCC on Trial: Experimentation Continues. EnvironmentalResearchWeb
Hulme M, Mahony M (2010) Climate change: what do we know about the IPCC? Progress in Physical
Geography
Kamada Y, Kominers SD (2010) Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992). Econ
Lett 107(2):112–114
Karl TR, Melillo JM, Peterson TC (eds.) (2009) Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Kintisch E (2010) IPCC seeks ‘broader community engagement’ to correct errors. Science 327(5967):768–
769
Kuik OJ, Brander L, Tol RSJ (2009) Marginal abatement costs of greenhouse gas emissions: A meta-analysis.
Energy Policy 37(4):1395–1403
Lindzen RS (1997) Statement Concerning Global Warming. Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, Washington
Lomborg B (ed.) (2010) Smart Solutions to Climate Change-Comparing Costs and Benefits. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
McKitrick R (2010) Fix the IPCC Process. Financial Post
McMichael AJ, Campbell-Lendrum DH, Corvalán CF, Ebi KL, Githeko AK, Scheraga JD, and Woodward A
(eds.) (2003) Climate change and human health—Risks and responses. World Health Organization,
Geneva
Mendelsohn RO (2006) A Critique of the Stern Report. Regulation (Winter 2006–2007), 42–46.
Moss RH, Schneider SH (2000) Towards Consistent Assessment and Reporting of Uncertainties in the IPCC
TAR. In: Pachauri RK, Taniguchi T (eds) Cross-Cutting Issues in the IPCC Third Assessment Report.
Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute, Tokyo
Moss RH, Edmonds JA, Hibbard KA, Manning MR, Rose SK, van Vuuren DP, Carter TR, Emori S, Kainuma
M, Kram T, Meehl GA, Mitchell JFB, Nakicenovic N, Riahi K, Smith SJ, Stouffer RJ, Thomson AM,
Weyant JP, Wilbanks TJ (2010) The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and
assessment. Nature 463(7282):747–756
Nakicenovic N, Swart RJ (eds.) (2001) IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge
Nature (2010) IPCC: Cherish it, tweak it or scrap it? Nature 463(7282):730–732
New Scientist (2010) Let the sunlight in on climate change. New Sci 205(2745):5
Nishioka S (2008) How did science and IPCC lead policy? Atomos 50(9):557–561
Nordhaus WD (2007) A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. J Econ Lit 45
(3):686–702
Nove A (1983) The Economics of Feasible Socialism. Unwin Hyman, Boston
Climatic Change (2011) 108:827–839 837
O’Neill BC (2000) The jury is still out on global warming potentials. Clim Change 44:427–443
O’Neill B, Nakicenovic N (2008) Learning from global emissions scenarios. Environ Res Lett 3(4)
O’Neill B, Pulver S, Vandeveer S, Garb Y (2008) Where next with global environmental scenarios? Environ
Res Lett 3(4)
Oppenheimer M, O’Neill BC, Webster M, Agrawala S (2007) Climate change: The limits of consensus.
Science 317(5844):1505–1506
Parmesan C, Yohe GW (2003) A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural
systems. Nature 421:37–41
Patuelli R, Nijkamp P, Pels E (2005) Environmental tax reform and the double dividend: A meta-analytical
performance assessment. Ecol Econ 55(4):564–583
PBL (2010) Assessing an IPCC Assessment – An Analysis of Statements on Projected Regional Impacts in
the 2007 Report. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, The Hague
Pearce DW (1995a) Valuing climate change. Chemistry & Industry 1024
Pearce F (1995b) Global row over value of human life. New Scientist 7
Pearce F (1995c) Price of Life Sends Temperatures Soaring. New Scientist 5
Peiser B (2007) IPCC: The Only Game in Town? Energy Environ 18(7–8)
Pielke RA Jr (2007) The Honest Broker—Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Pielke RA Jr, Wigley TML, Green C (2008) Dangerous Assumptions. Nature 452:531–532
Risbey JS, Kandlikar M (2007a) Expressions of Likelihood and Confidence in the IPCC Uncertainty
Assessment Process. Clim Change 85:19–31
Risbey JS, Kandlikar M (2007b) Expressions of likelihood and confidence in the IPCC uncertainty
assessment process. Clim Change 85(1–2):19–31
Root TL, Price JT, Hall KR, Schneider SH, Rosenzweig C, Pounds JA (2003) Fingerprints of global warming
on wild animals and plants. Nature 421(6918):57–60
Rosenthal E (2010) Skeptics Find Fault with UN Climate Panel. New York Times, New York
Rothman DS, van Bers C, Bakkes J, Pahl-Wostl C (2009) How to make global assessments more effective:
lessons from the assessment community. Curr Opin Environ Sus 1(2):214–218
Schiermeier Q (2010) IPCC flooded by criticism. Nature 463(7281):596–597
Schimel D, Alves D, Enting I, Heimann M, Joos F, Raynaud M, Derwent R, Ehhalt D, Fraser P, Sanhueza E,
Zhou X, Jonas P, Charlson R, Rodhe H, Sadasivan S, Shine KP, Fouquart Y, Ramaswamy V, Solomon S,
Srinivasan J, Albritton DL, Isaksen ISA, Lal M, Wuebbles DJ (1996) Radiative Forcing of Climate
Change. In: Houghton JT et al (eds) Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change—
Contribution of Working Group I to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 1st edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 65–131
Schneider SH, Semenov S, Patwardhan A, Burton I, Magadya CHD, Oppenheimer M, Pittock AB, Rahman
A, Smith JB, Suarez A, Yamin F (2007) Assessing Key Vulnerability and the Risk from Climate Change.
In: Parry ML et al (eds) Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability—Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 779–810
Shapiro HT, Diab R, de Brito Cruz CH, Cropper ML, Fang J, Fresco LO, Manabe S, Mehta G, Molina M,
Williams P, Winacker E-L, Zakri AH (2010) Climate Change Assessments—Review of the Processes and
Procedures of the IPCC. InterAcademy Council, Amsterdam
Sharkey W (1982) The Theory of Natural Monopoly. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Shine KP, Fuglestvedt JS, Hailemariam K, Stuber N (2005) Alternatives to the global warming potential for
comparing climate impacts of emissions of greenhouse gases. Clim Change 68:281–302
Smith SJ (2003) The Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Indices—An Editorial Comment. Clim Change 58:261–265
Smith JB, Schellnhuber H-J, Mirza MQ, Fankhauser S, Leemans R, Erda L, Ogallo L, Pittock AB, Richels
RG, Rosenzweig C, Safriel U, Tol RSJ, Weyant JP, Yohe GW (2001) Vulnerability to Climate Change
and Reasons for Concern: A Synthesis. In: McCarthy JJ et al (eds) Climate Change 2001: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, pp 913–967
Solomon S, Manning M (2008) The IPCC must maintain its rigor. Science 319(5869):1457
Stern NH, Peters S, Bakhski V, Bowen A, Cameron C, Catovsky S, Crane D, Cruickshank S, Dietz S,
Edmondson N, Garbett S-L, Hamid L, Hoffman G, Ingram D, Jones B, Patmore N, Radcliffe H,
Sathiyarajah R, Stock M, Taylor C, Vernon T, Wanjie H, Zenghelis D (2006) Stern review: the economics
of climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Tavoni M, Tol RSJ (2010) Counting only the hits? The risk of underestimating the costs of stringent climate
policy: a letter. Clim Change 100(3):769–778
Terradas J, Penuelas J (2008) Climate change policy: IPCC consensus is not enough. Ambio 37(4):321–322
The Economist (2003a) Hot potato revisited: a lack-of-progress report on the IPCC. The Economist
838 Climatic Change (2011) 108:827–839
The Economist (2003b) Hot potato: the IPCC had better check its calculations. The Economist
The Economist (2010a) A Time for introspection. The Economist
The Economist (2010b) Flawed scientists. The Economist
The Economist (2010c) Science behind closed doors. The Economist
Tinbergen J (1952) On the Theory of Economic Policy. North Holland, Amsterdam
Tinbergen J (1954) Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy. North Holland, Amsterdam
Tirole J (2000) The Theory of Industrial Organization, 11th printing edn. MIT Press, Cambridge
Tol RSJ (2009) The Economic Effects of Climate Change. J Econ Perspect 23(2):29–51
Train KE (1991) Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly. MIT Press, Cambridge
Ulph AM, Maddison DJ (1997) Uncertainty Learning and International Environmental Policy Coordination.
Environ Res Econ 9:451–466
van den Bergh JCJM, Button KJ, Nijkamp P, Pepping GC (1997) Meta-Analysis in Environmental
Economics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
van der Sluijs JP, van Est R, RiphagenM (2010) Beyond consensus: Reflections from a democratic perspective on
the interaction between climate politics and science. Curr Opin Environ Sus 2(5–6):409–415
Waterson M (1988) Regulation of the Firm and Natural Monopoly. Blackwell, New York
Weitzman ML (2007) A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. J Econ Lit 45
(3):703–724
WHO (1990) Potential Health Effects of Climatic Change. World Health Organization, Geneva
WMO (2006) Summary Statement on Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change. World Meteorological
Organization, Geneva
Wynne B (2010) Strange weather, again: Climate science as political art. Theory Cult Soc 27(2):289–305
Zillman JW (2007) Some observations on the IPCC assessment process 1988–2007. Energy Environ
18(7–8):869–891
Climatic Change (2011) 108:827–839 839
